Russia’s new combat icebreaker, known as the Project 23550 Ivan Papanin, has embarked on factory sea trials, signaling Russia’s intensified strategic focus on the Arctic amid an emerging New Cold War.
This month, The War Zone reported the icebreaker is designed not only to navigate through ice but is also armed and has the potential to be equipped with cruise missiles.
The vessel, constructed at the Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, was initially scheduled for commissioning in 2023 but has faced delays, partly due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, The War Zone report said.
The Ivan Papanin’s armament includes an AK-176MA 76mm gun and can be fitted with containerized launchers for Klub and Kalibr cruise missiles, which would significantly enhance its combat capabilities.
Russia has a growing fleet of around 40 icebreakers and ice-capable ships, including the unique Project 23550 class specifically designed for combat and breaking through ice up to 5.5 feet thick.
Russia’s introduction of the Ivan Papanin into its icebreaker fleet reflects its more extensive Arctic interests and military strategy, driven primarily by multifaceted and interrelated economic and security concerns.
In a March 2020 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Heather Conley and other writers mention that Russia’s military presence in the Arctic seeks to enhance homeland security by acting as a forward line of defense against foreign incursion as the region attracts increased international investment, secure Russia’s economic future and create a staging ground for power projection in the North Atlantic.
Conley and others say that the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a 5,600-kilometer-long waterway stretching from the Bering Strait to the Kara Sea, is viewed by Russia as a strategically important internal waterway. In contrast, they note that most members of the international community view the NSR as an international passage.
Beyond controlling sea lines of communication such as the NSR, John Grade mentions in a March 2024 US Naval Institute (USNI) article that the Arctic holds 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves, 30% of undiscovered natural gas and US$1 trillion worth of valuable minerals like palladium, cobalt and nickel, which are in demand for various high-tech industries.
Those resources are stirring an international scramble for the Arctic as global warming makes them more accessible. Canada, the US and Scandinavian countries have a substantial Arctic presence. China declared itself a “near-Arctic state” in 2018, setting the stage for great power competition in the formerly remote and inaccessible frozen region.
Grade notes that Russia follows a “first to market” strategy by extending claims over increasingly open waterways to international maritime traffic. In line with that, Conley and others note that Russia has given bureaucratic control of the NSR to its nuclear power agency, Rosatom, and has limited the passage of foreign warships without a 45-day notification and government permission.
Speaking of Russia’s militarization of the Arctic, Grade says that Russia has stationed long-range cruise missiles that can hit Canadian and US targets, with its bombers testing the northern approaches’ defenses and the stationing of a cruise missile submarine on its Pacific coast.
Further, Michael Paul and Göran Swistek, in a February 2022 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) paper, mention that Russia is prioritizing the expansion and modernization of its Northern Fleet, which aims to project power beyond its “brown” coastal waters into the Atlantic and Pacific.
According to Paul and Swistek, the Northern Fleet is pivotal to Russia’s nuclear deterrence, economic interests and resource protection, making it the most significant military presence in the Arctic. Its upgrade to an autonomous military district in January 2021 underscores the Arctic’s significance in Russia’s national defense strategy.
They mention developments that illustrate the strategic importance of the Arctic to Russia’s interests, such as the construction of new military infrastructure, the demonstration of nuclear submarines’ capability to surface through thick ice and the incorporation of Russia’s controversial “doomsday” Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drone to the fleet’s arsenal.
In a November 2020 SWP paper, Janis Kluge and Michael Paul mention that the Northern Fleet’s priority is to defend Russia’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), which constitute two-thirds of its naval nuclear deterrent.
Kluge and Paul note that in a conflict, the fleet would secure access to the Atlantic while blocking hostile forces from the Russian Arctic in a bastion strategy to defend its SSBNs and secure a second-strike capability.
They note that while Russia maintains a defensive posture in the Arctic, it is prepared for rapid escalation in the event of conflict, including potential offensive operations to defend the bastion and possibly occupy parts of northern Scandinavia.
However, the Ukraine war may have significantly impacted Russia’s Arctic military posture. While the ongoing conflict may not have affected Russia’s strategic deterrent posture, its implications may have a drawn-out effect at operational and tactical levels.
In a January 2023 CSIS article, Colin Wall and Njord Wegge mention that Russia’s Arctic military branches, particularly the Northern Fleet, maintain a credible second-strike nuclear capability despite the Ukraine war’s staggering material and human cost.
Wall and Wegge note that while Russia’s short-term threats to the West via naval and air assets remain primarily unaffected, sanctions may impact Russia’s defense industry in the long run, potentially weakening the Northern Fleet’s formidability in 5-10 years.
In particular, they say that Russia’s scarcity of precision munitions could deter offensive measures against Arctic NATO allies. At the same time, they point out that while Russia’s air defense capacity remains intact, replacing short-range Pantsir missile systems lost in Ukraine may pose challenges.
However, Wall and Wegge point out that Russia’s increasing use of “hybrid warfare” tactics in the Arctic suggests that Russia may favor hybrid strategies to exert influence and create uncertainty amidst its diminished conventional military capacity in the Arctic.
Katarina Kertysova and Gabriella Gricius note in an August 2023 European Leadership Network paper that Russia has employed four trends in its hybrid warfare efforts in the Arctic since February 2022, namely: an escalation in cyber activities, critical infrastructure interference, espionage and criminal activity.
Kertysova and Gricius say that cyber operations, notably distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, have surged across Arctic nations, targeting governmental systems and electoral processes.
They also say critical infrastructure, such as undersea cables and pipelines, has also faced increased threats, with incidents like the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage highlighting vulnerabilities.
Kertysova and Gricius point out that espionage efforts have been intensified, with accusations of Russian spying in territorial waters using civilian vessels. Additionally, they say criminal activities have emerged as a new tool in Russia’s arsenal, further complicating the Arctic’s fast-shifting security landscape.
