This year’s annual Balikatan joint military exercises between the Philippines and the United States (April 22-May 10) broke much new ground. So did China’s response to it. The exercise areas and the arms deployed showed the linkage of South China Sea and Taiwan Strait hotspots. A surge in Chinese vessel presence in Manila’s western exclusive economic zone and another violent sea incident over a contested reef expose Beijing’s defiance amid the alliance’s show of force.
The display of strength and the reaction to it escalated tensions in choppy waters and raised questions about the drill’s deterrent value. The symbolism and messages show how parties are digging in, accepting more risk and shrinking the space for diplomacy.
Expanded and evolved show of allies’ force
The 39th Balikatan exercise was billed as the “most effective, most ambitious and most complicated” yet. It built on advances made in recent editions of the annual drill, which had become a laboratory for testing new defense concepts and weapons in the field.
In 2022, US-made Patriot missiles were amphibiously inserted by land and sea in Cagayan, one of the Philippines’ northernmost provinces opposite Taiwan.
Last year, live-fire demonstrations of Patriot and Avenger missiles occurred in Zambales, a coastal province facing the West Philippine Sea. For the first time, a sinking exercise (SINKEX) was also conducted with a decommissioned corvette as a mock target hit by volleys from land, air, and sea platforms. The event was also held off Zambales, 235 kilometers from Scarborough Shoal, a contested feature between Manila and Beijing.
This year, it was the turn of the Typhon ground-based missile, with a range of 1600 kilometers, to appear in a joint army exercise preceding Balikatan. For the first time, Patriot missile launchers were also deployed at Clark, a former US airbase in central Luzon.
Whether these arms will eventually be prepositioned to agreed locations under the Philipppines-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) bears watching. The Typhon missiles remain in place in undisclosed sites well after the exercise, fueling speculation that they are now stationed in the country. EDCA bases were expanded from five to nine last year, with three new sites in northern Luzon and an additional site in southern Palawan.
If they ever get fixed in such places, will China react the same way it did when South Korea allowed the installation of US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles on its soil? If so, Manila’s waning ties with its big neighbor and largest trade partner may further deteriorate. Beijing condemned the missile deployment. PRC Defence Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said they “brought huge risks of war into the region,” noting that “intermediate-range missiles are strategic and offensive weapons with a strong Cold War color.”
The external defense and multi-domain orientation of recent Balikatan rounds have been sharpened. This year’s iteration included island protection and retaking and air and missile defense, as well as cybersecurity and information operations. It also saw the debut participation of the Philippine Coast Guard, an agency at the forefront of dealing with an increasingly forceful China in rough waters.
US HIMARS rockets were also fired in Palawan, a vanguard province facing the South China Sea.
A SINKEX was conducted in President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s home province of Ilocos Norte, also in northern Luzon. A Chinese-made former naval tanker became the target, raising conjectures despite explanations that the same was merely coincidental.
Most importantly, for the first time, maritime activities went beyond the country’s 12 nautical-mile territorial seas. France, which hopes to supply Manila with submarines, dispatched a frigate to join their Filipino and American counterparts, who sailed from the Sulu Sea to the South China Sea. Paris’s entry was its first. Fourteen countries, including fellow South China Sea littoral states Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, also sent observers.
China: defiant and undeterred
Manila’s unprecedented moves were met by Beijing’s bold measures. Chinese government and militia vessels were sighted near Philippine outposts in the South China Sea. The included three Chinese maritime research vessels spotted in the Second Thomas Shoal, a recent flashpoint between the two neighbors. Another was seen off Catanduanes and Samar, way off in the country’s east facing the Pacific Ocean.
Four Chinese PLA Navy vessels took turns tailing the allied flotilla consisting of four ships – two Philippine, one American and one French – that were conducting multilateral maritime exercises in the South China Sea.
While Balikatan was underway, a new incident happened in Scarborough Shoal. Two Philippine government vessels suffered damage from ramming and water cannons by three Chin Coast Guard ships. That came on the heels of a March episode wherein a Philippine civilian boat contracted by the military was likewise subjected to high-pressure water blasting by two Chinese coast guard ships.
The expectation that Balikatan, especially with the presence of foreign navies, would compel China to behave properly and restrain from taking assertive actions fumbled. The latest sea incident was denounced by several countries. But beyond flouting international law and reputational costs, China’s defiance made a strong statement: The upgraded exercise no longer deters Beijing, nor does Manila’s transparency drive in the contested sea.
Will this trigger the alliance to calibrate response? Injuries to sailors and damage to property and all, Chinese actions still do not meet the definition of “armed attack” necessary to trigger much-vaunted US pledges of ironclad commitment to its junior ally. The Scarborough Shoal water blasting affair may embolden China to push the envelope further. More untoward instances, in turn, may erode trust in the alliance’s ability to push back beyond rhetorical denunciations.
A more expansive and evolved Balikatan is part of the Philippines’ approach of deepening defense relations with the US and other partners to ward off China. Failure to get satisfactory results may force a rethink. This may play into China’s desire to diminish Manila’s strong bond with its former colonizer and longtime treaty ally and exclude non-regional powers from the intractable sea row.
Yet, close calls and all, disputants still tolerate further risk. Manila remains headstrong with its exposé of Chinese activities in contested waters and taking part in combined activities with allies and partners. Diplomatic protests are piling up with no foreseen high-level dialogue with Beijing.
In marked contrast, American and Chinese defense chiefs met on the sidelines of this year’s Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore last month, the first since 2022. It is part of a series of high-level official contacts to try to stabilize ties between the two rivals as the US heads to elections late in the year.
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken went to China in quick succession last April. Blinken’s trip coincided with the early days of Balikatan.
The South China Sea is only one of the many thorny issues that divide the two major powers and may not even be the most pressing one. On the other hand, Beijing is not backing down and continues to up pressure against its smaller neighbor even in the presence of its big ally.
If China’s response to this year’s Balikatan shows the limits of deterrence, the South China Sea may be in for more turbulence.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies and a research fellow at Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation.
